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PROCEDURES FOLLOWING MINE FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS

by
W. R. Park
Health & Safety Division
U. S. Bureau of Mines
Mt. Hope, West Virginia
Well organized, orderly recovery operations following mine fires
and explosions do not occur just by chance. Such grganization has
resulted from thoughtful preparation and effort by those in authority
at a mine in developing procedures to be followed in the event of a
fire or explosion. Although recovery operations following such occur
rences may be different at each mine, there are many general rules and
practices that should be followed.
Several years ago, an explosion occurred in a mine in southern
West Virginia; 22 men died in that disaster. Recovery work was oderly, well organized, well handled, and presented a minimum calculated
risk to those performing the operations. The good organization and
effective handling of the job, particularly by company officials,
doubtless resulted from the fact that they were experienced. This
disaster was the third that had occurred in the company's mines in
slightly less than 2 years. While we naturally deplore the circum
stances that gave this company its experience, it is clear that some
thing important was learned from each emergency. Hopefully, the day
is not far off when we will have learned enough to prevent disasters
altogether.
In contrast to the performance in connection with that disaster
were the events surrounding an explosion that occurred the following
day in a mine in central West Virginia near Summersville. Recovery
operations at this mine were completely chaotic. The superintendent,
assistant superintendent, and the acting mine foreman were underground
when the explosion occurred. The superintendent and the assistant
superintendent were killed, and the acting mine foreman exhausted
himself underground attempting recovery operations. The general mine
foreman, who was off duty and out of the State, did not learn of the
explosion until the next day. Therefore, company officials with
authority were not immediately available, and officials from other
mines of the company did not arrive on the scene until late in the
evening. Neighboring mine officials arrived at the mine shortly after
learning of the disaster and these officials helped in every possible
way; however, they had practically no experience with recovery work.
The mine is reached by one narrow mountainous road, and hundreds
of people arrived at the mine during the first several hours after
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the explosion. These people more than used all of the parking space
available, blocked the road so that it was almost impossible to get to
and away from the mine, and converged on the mine offices and other
buildings until it was almost impossible to reach the mine openings, the
buildings, or supplies. Furthermore, this crowd of people made it very
difficult to converse with mine personnel, the recovery groups, and
underground personnel. The crowd also hindered the collection of sup
plies and materials as well as the moving of such supplies and materials
underground.
Underground recovery operations were slightly better organized,
but overall direction of the underground work was not firm, and con
tact between the underground workers and surface people was extremely
difficult. Although this explosion occurred during the morning of
October 28, when Mr. Westfield and I arrived on the scene late in the
evening, we found that overall recovery operations were in chaos, re
covery work was poorly organized, and far too many people, including
widows and children of the victims, were in the mine yard and buildings.
Before going underground, we made some progress in having the surface
activities controlled by having the mine yard roped off and patrolled
by police officers, who after considerable difficulty were able to
keep spectators out of the roped-off area. Company officials and State
and Federal inspectors were assigned specific necessary duties on the
surface, and underground many people were sent to the surface. Re
covery operations were then planned and outlined and individuals were
given specific duties and responsibilities.
Each of us here today likely believes and certainly hopes that
neither a fire nor an explosion will occur in our mine; however, they
do occur occasionally in even the best managed, wel1-maintained mines
and when they do occur, particularly an explosion, the following steps
must be taken promptly.
If you are the highest man in authority at
the mine when you learn that an explosion has occurred underground,
vou should immediately:
1. Have the main fan or fans checked to see that they are oper
ating satisfactorily and keep whatever men are necessary at the fans
to see that they stay in operation constantly. Repair any damage to
the fan explosion doors or air duct.
2. Have the mine electrician or some other qualified person de
energize the mine electrical circuits and be certain that the discon
nect switches are locked open or stay open until such time as those in
authority deem it safe to reenergize the underground power lines.
3. Contact all underground working sections and other people
underground, advise those you are able to contact to begin moving to
the surface or to remain in-the section and barricade themselves, or
to take whatever actions is indicated by the circumstances and your
conversation. Certainly, if the explosion is local or confined to one
or two sections, you will not be able to contact these areas but will
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be able to contact other working sections of the mine. Advise the
underground personnel you are able to contact of all the details you
know concerning the disaster and advise them on how they are to travel
to the surface and on which escape routes they can most likely travel
with the greatest degree of safety.
4. Notify higher local company officials of the occurrence, give
them as many details as possible, and either notify all other high
company officials or arrange to have some other person do so.
5. Notify or arrange to have notified local State and Federal
inspectors as well as the main offices of the State and Federal in
spectors. Notify or arrange to have law enforcement authorities ad
vised of the disaster and request their assistance in keeping highways,
parking areas, and the mine yard free of spectators and other people
who are not essential to the recovery operations. Prepare or arrange
to have prepared rooms for a first-aid station and a rescue station.
Check or arrange to check first-aid supplies and stretchers. Arrange
to obtain additional supplies if needed.
6. Arrange to alert mine rescue teams if they work on other shifts
or rescue teams from neighboring mines of the company or other comoanv
mines in the area. Assemble or arrange to have assembled mine rescue
apparatus and equipment. Establish immediately a preliminary plan of
underground recovery operations, and if you are unable to lead this
group, appoint the best qualified man available to be in charge of the
recovery party. Outline the preliminary recovery operations as much
as possible and arrange to have continuous contact between the recovery
party and the surface by telephone or by whatever other means that are
available. Alert or arrange to alert doctors and ambulances of the
disaster and the possible need of service.
7. Establish some type of public relations and information service.
Immediately after information of the disaster becomes available to the
news media, newspaper, TV, and radio representatives will begin arriving
on the scene.
a. A capable individual should be appointed to represent the
company and give the news media information as it becomes
available.
b. Telephone calls by the hundreds will begin coming to the
mine from people requesting information concerning husbands,
sons, brothers, and relatives; also, neighboring mine officials
as well as mine officials from hundreds of miles away will call
offering personal assistance as well as assistance in supplying
materials and equipment.
8. Arrange to have employees needed for immediate underground work
report to the mine as well as arrange to have personnel for succeeding
shifts.
Arrange to provide the necessary tools and equipment for re
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covery operations, such as saws, hammers, axes and brattice cloth.
Where such tools and supplies are not immediately available at the mine,
arrange to have them brought to the mine from other company mines,
neighboring mines and warehouses. Arrange to have such supplies and
materials stored and distributed by competent personnel. Arrange for
food and perhaps housing for mine rescue teams and other members of the
recovery parties when necessary. Arrange to furnish transportation for
rescue teams and other members of the recovery party where necessary.
Arrange with the engineering department to have prints of the sections
of the mine affected by the disaster available in large numbers, par
ticularly for the members of the recovery parties. Establish a positive
check-in and check-out system and maintain the check-in and check-out
system throughout the recovery operations.
9.
If adjoining mines are interconnected with the disaster mine,
the adjoining mine officials should be advised of the disaster so that
employees in the adjoining mine may be withdrawn to the surface if
necessary.
UNDERGROUND RECOVERY OPERATIONS
The company official leading the recovery party initially travels
towards the explosion areas as carefully as possible looking partic
ularly for the first evidence of explosion forces. Such evidence often
is--a fine layer of mixed coal and rock dust that will settle on rockdusted surfaces. Paper and other light materials are scattered by
forces of the explosion and are carried and deposited on the haulage
tracks and in other out-of-the-ordinary places. Recovery parties should
not travel into a location showing positive evidence of explosion
forces, unless the group is equipped with a carbon monoxide detector
and a flame safety lamp.
Advancing into the affected area safely requires that the group be
certain that they do not travel into oxygen-deficient or highlyexplosive atmospheres. All mine explosions produce carbon monoxide
and continuous testing with a carbon monoxide detector is an absolute
necessity. The presence of carbon monoxide in an area shows clearly
that protective equipment in the way of gas masks, Chemox, or oxygen
breathing apparatus is necessary and must be used to examine inby
areas. Many mine employees and officials have lost their lives by
entering explosion areas without being able to check whether carbon
monoxide was present in the area and without using protective equip
ment. You certainly can't help men trapped inby if you are overcome
with carbon monoxide.
Whenever possible, recovery parties should enter underground mines
and thereafter travel in intake air; when blown-out stoppings or over
casts or doors are first encountered, caution must be exercised, travel
inby must be on foot and be slow, careful, and cautious. Continuous
tests for oxygen deficiency, methane, and carbon dioxide should be made
in the area with flame safety lamps and carbon monoxide detectors.
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Where large areas have been affected and/or where methane or carbon
monoxide is detected and stoppings and other ventilation facilities
have been destroyed, mine rescue teams wearing protective equipment
should examine as much inby area as possible before temporary ventilation
is established by the erection of temporary stoppings and other ventil
ation facilities. Fairly effective temporary ventilation can be estab
lished by installing stoppings, checks, doors, and overcasts erected of
canvas or plastics. Checks should be installed by the mine rescue
teams. Mine rescue teams can usually examine inby in the explosion
area for distances of about 500 feet. The explosion area should be ex
amined and reventilated in this manner until the entire area has been
recovered.
The recovery party should not pass side entries, rooms, abandoned
areas, et cetera, until such areas have been examined or sealed. The
foregoing methods of advance minimize the chances of forcing methane
over an undetected fire in the explosion area which could result in
a second or third explosion. While recovery parties are exploring
and reventilating the explosion area, other men should be testing the
air returning from the newly-ventilated area and in the main returns.
Advancing recovery crews should be advised regarding such tests, and
sudden or gradual increases in the methane and/or carbon monoxide
percentages in these returns are danger signals that should be con
sidered carefully by those in charge. Increased carbon monoxide gen
erally indicates that there is a fire somewhere inby and an increase
of methane indicates an explosive mixture of methane could be forced
over the fire and cause an explosion.
A substantial increase in
carbon monoxide or methane content in air returning from an unexplored
explosion area requires that recovery operations should be reevaluated
and perhaps abandoned at least temporarily.
Recovery parties, of course, should attempt to reach and remove
live persons from an explosion area as rapidly and safely as possible.
However, care should be exercised in not disturbing evidence of the
explosion in the affected area. Equipment, particularly controls of
equipment, should not be disturbed, and exact records should be made
of locations of equipment, line brattice, checks, stoppings, doors,
clothing, bodies and flame safety lamps. Finally, and of major im
portance, underground recovery parties should follow plans and pro
cedures of those in overall charge of the recovery operations. If the
explosion area is large or if recovery operations are difficult and
extend for more than 8 or 10 hours, recovery operations should be put
on four 6-hour shifts with the crews relieving at the inby work
locations.
When bodies are located by recovery crews, each body should be
indent!fied by the lamp number or the indentification tag. The
exact location of the body and number should be recorded in writing
on a blueprint of the area when such print is available. Recovery
crew members should not search the clothing on bodies, as there have
been claims that money, watches, and other valuables have been taken
from bodies by members of recovery parties.

3.

Flooding fire area or entire mine - when considered, con
sider elevations - possibility of flooding area - effect of
gas pressures.

4.

Flushing with silt or other solid materials. Feasible on
occasion, particularly if mine will not be reopened.

5.

Use of inert gases - carbon dioxide. Effect of sealing or
extinguishing fire is calculated from chemical analyses of
air from sealed area. Fire in sealed area is considered
extinguished when:
a.

Oxygen content of the sealed area will not support flame.

b. Carbon monoxide has disappeared from the atmosphere in
the sealed area.
c. Area has been sealed for a sufficient length of time to
preclude the likelihood of the fire rekindling.
Time for unsealing a fire area should be governed by:
1.

Extent and intensity of fire at time of sealing

2.

Type of burning material.

3.

Tightness of seals and enclosed areas.

4.

Influence of barometric pressure on enclosed area.

5.

Position of fire area with respect to ventilation pressures.

6.

Sampling and analyses.

7.

Composition of fire gases in sealed area.

Preparation for unsealing:
1.

Available apparatus and gas mask crews.

2.

Ventilation changes when necessary - fire atmosphere directly
to return airways.

3.

Heavy rock-dusting outby seals.

4.

Fan location and operation - with respect to fire location and
seals.

5.

Power circuits - deenergized.
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MINE FIRES
Most mining men fear mine-fire hazards more than hazards encountered
during recovery operations after an explosion because of possible ex
plosion hazard, roof falls, fumes, heat and smoke.
Therefore, proper procedure in fighting, sealing, and unsealing mine
fires is of the utmost importance. Incorrect procedure may result in
one or more of the following:
1. Men working in the mine when a fire occurs may be needlessly
exposed to or overcome by smoke and fumes from the fire.
2. An explosion with possible loss of life and property may occur
during the fighting, sealing, or unsealing operations.
3. The lives of those engaged in fighting, sealing, or unsealing
a mine fire may be jeopardized or sacrificed needlessly.
4. Property loss may be increased or curtailment of production
prolonged.
Methods of Control and Extinguishment of Mine Fires
1.

Fighting by direct attack.
a. With water, rock dust, sand, foam generator, chemicals,
fire truck, carbon dioxide.
b. Fires can usually be extinguished by direct attack when
in the incipient stage, but when underground fires burn
freely for several hours, such fires often require sealing.
Therefore, it is necessary to begin firefighting operations
as rapidly and as orderly as possible. Water is still the
best extinguishing agent for fires, but fire materials
must be loaded and removed from the mine after the fire is
extinguished and the materials cooled.

2.

Sealing fire area - always necessary when there is danger of
methane in the fire area.
a. Simultaneous sealing of intake and return entries is
necessary when dangers are presented by methane.
b. Closure seals should be at least 1,000 feet from fire
where possible.
c. Sealing materials - lumber and wood fiber, concrete blocks,
brick, brattice cloth.
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6.

Unsealing methods in writing for all people.

7.

Air locking when necessary.

8.

Unsealing by reventilating area and immediate exploration most common method.
a. Break intake air seal - examine fire area by apparatus
crew first - then open return seals. Combustible gases should
be kept below explosion limits - have men with detectors check
returns at regulators.

In conclusion, don't ever expect that a fire or explosion recovery
operation will be the same as one you were on previously - all are
different in one respect or another.

COMMENTS
QUESTION: I have a question for Mr. O'Neal. In cases of mine disasters
who has jurisdiction over this, the company, the Federal Bureau of Mines
or the State Bureau of Mines?
ANSWER: I believe this is usually a joint venture but I believe that
the state is overall the first option for the authority. I think the
state and then the Bureau usually has a cooperative effort.
Mr. Richardson: I have just come from Washington and I heard this great
argument going on between the pros and cons, those that think that
the flame safety lamp is the only thing and others who think that this
is not necessarily the instrument to use. I happen to be one who thinks
it is but I would like your views upon this with respect to oxygen con
tent and so forth.
ANSWER: This is a controversy that came up just recently in the last
month or six weeks. The flame safety lamp has been long recognized-I guess for a 150 years or more--as an instrument for determining methane
or an oxygen deficient atmosphere. As far as I know there has been
no official policy adopted by our people in Mt. Hope. Myself, I like
it. Although I understand that there is a possibility of going to
differenct instrumentation. Here again this is all up in the air and
I don't know what will be the final outcome. But I think the flame
safety lamp is a good instrument for its purpose. That's just a per
sonal opinion.
Mr. Gilliland: Jim, since you raised the issue that there were some
people that didn't think that the flame safety lamp was so good, would
you care to give some reasons that you may have heard as to why it
isn't so good? I thought that you maybe had heard some specific
comments that might be of value.
Reply: Wei 1, I have no comments upon it at all. I have no knowledge
of others that work so well.
I don't know of anything else that does.
They all depend upon batteries, but sometimes they're not working and
this is the point that I question. It just goes back to the fact that
some of the old things are still the best.
QUESTION: I'd like to ask a question of Mr. O'Neal. Due to the
Farmington disaster, will there be any intensification of research
work perhaps in degassification of coal seams, say something in the
advance of the working face to get this gas out? Is the Bureau doing
anything in this area?
ANSWER: I couldn't tell you for sure about their policies.
stand that there will be additional research on this.

I under
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QUESTION: On the Farmington disaster, has there been a decision reached
as to the primary cause? Is there something that's particularly been
hit upon?
ANSWER: No. No one is making a guess as to what particular incident
actually transpired to set it in motion.
Dr. Scott: May I make one comment.
It came to mind in Mr. O'Neal's
talk about public news media in relation to these disasters. I don't
know how many of us here saw CBS's program entitled "Mines-Danger" but
I think there is a lot for us in the mineral industry to think about
in the publicity area. I tried to do something about this in this
conference.•. That is, I tried to get some coverage by the national
medias of this' conference.
I talked with some vice presidents of NBC
and of CBS on this by phone for some considerable period of time and
felt I had made some progress. However, I don't see the television
cameras in this room.
I suggested to the news media that perhaps such
a title as "Mines-Danger" was not just, considering what they covered.
They didn't sa "Danger gaseous coal mines of West Virginia" - gaseous
coal seams whether it's the state of West Virginia or any other state.
They said "Mines-Danger." And that puts the little limestone pro
ducer, uranium miners, lead miners, and everyone else, even me as an
educator, in the same basket. I don't know quite what to do about
this. It's so hard for me to talk to a mother about her son coming here
to school and for her to encourage him in a mineral oriented career
when the only thing that she has seen, that relates to the industry, is
some widow being asked a question at the time of the disaster, 'Well
do you think we should have more mine inspection?' What a loaded question
to put to some poor person who has just lost her husband. This is slanted
news coverage. In the mineral industry these disasters are terrible
but I think we have to stand up on our feet as professional people, as
dedicated people to this industry in which we are involved, stand and be
counted. We're not all bad. We're working on these problems and I get
quite disturbed about this sometimes, I don't really know the answer
to the problem.
COMMENT FROM FLOOR: Well you know this slanted news doesn't necessarily
just apply to disasters. I'm going to use an example. Back in about
1961 when all the news media discovered all this poverty down in
southern West Virginia and eastern Kentucky NBC came down to souther
West Virginia and wanted to see a poverty stricken area. The people
took him to see a town called Matoka which for all practical purposes was
an abandoned mining town and the school was still there. This school
was in pretty bad shape, windows were knocked out and there was maybe
one or two rooms and one or two teachers. So cameramen were all over
the place and used this on an evening news program.
It so happened in the
same county they had just finished about a 3 million dollar high school.
So after the people got through showing the school in Matoka and all
the pictures had been taken they asked them to come over and see their
new school. Their reply was 'Oh, we're not interested in seeing new
schools.'

